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COULD GOD LOVE CRUELTY?
A Partial Defense of Unrestricted Theological Voluntarism
Laura Frances Callahan
One of the foremost objections to theological voluntarism is the contingency 
objection. If God’s will fixes moral facts, then what if God willed that agents 
engage in cruelty? I  argue that even unrestricted theological voluntarists 
should accept some logical constraints on possible moral systems—hence, 
some limits on ways that God could have willed morality to be—and these 
logical constraints are sufficient to blunt the force of the contingency objec-
tion. One constraint I defend is a very weak accessibility requirement, related 
to (but less problematic than) existence internalism in metaethics. The theo-
logical voluntarist can maintain: Godcouldn’t have loved cruelty, and even 
though he could have willed behaviors we find abhorrent, he could only 
have done so in a world of deeply alien moral agents. We cannot confidently 
declare such a world unacceptable.
I. Introduction
Even among theists, divine command theory is commonly thought to be 
deeply problematic. Some problems are mitigated when one moves from 
sourcing morality in God’s commands, specifically, to sourcing it in his1 
will, more generally. Perhaps it’s not specific, communicative commands 
from God to groups of humans that fix the moral facts; it’s something 
more universal about what God wants humans to do, or the behaviors 
that he would choose for them, or loves. Even so, proponents of this more 
general “theological voluntarism” are not large in number among theistic 
philosophers.2
This is not too puzzling. After all, a seemingly devastating worry for 
the view is well known. Does God will the kinds of human conduct he 
does because such conduct is moral? Or instead, is the conduct God wills 
moral because God wills it?3 If we assent to the first, we give up on a 
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
applyparastyle "fig" parastyle "Figure"
1I follow (possibly regrettable) convention in referring to God with masculine pronouns.
2On divine command theory vs. theological voluntarism, see Murphy, God and Moral Law, 
100. Murphy credits Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Ethics,” with the term.
3This is of course the “Euthyphro problem.” See Plato, Euthyphro.
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theological voluntarism worthy of the name. If we assent to the second, 
we seem to introduce morally abhorrent contingency into the question of 
what we might owe to one other. What if God were to will cruelty?4
My project here is defensive and limited. I will not offer positive moti-
vations for theological voluntarism,5 nor will I  attempt to address all 
major worries one might have about the view. But I will attempt to cast 
doubt on this objection from contingency, which is pervasive in the litera-
ture and often thought to be damning. The theological voluntarist should 
indeed think morality is contingent—that fundamental moral norms, val-
ues, and reasons could have been radically different than in fact they are. 
But, I’ll argue, she needn’t think we ourselves could have been subject to 
such a radically different system of morality. And the theological volunta-
rist’s commitment to the idea that God could have created a very different 
moral order—for very different, alien moral agents—does not generate a 
powerful objection to the view.
My strategy, broadly, is to consider logical constraints on moral facts—
hence constraints on the ways even a sovereign, omnipotent God might 
will morality to be. God cannot make the number 3 a color. He cannot 
make triangles have four sides. Neither, I  claim, can he make what’s 
morally good also be (in the same respect) morally bad.6 And neither, I’ll 
argue, can he make a genuine system of morality for some agents that is 
wholly opaque to all of those agents; robust, universal opacity is the sort 
of property that morality could not logically have.
My approach is thus very different from other recent attempts to recon-
cile theological voluntarism with constraints on the moral systems or laws 
an authoritative God might will. I do not claim that an authoritative moral 
legislator is necessarily loving or that God’s commands are constrained 
by non-voluntarist, “pre-existing” moral values. Hence, this is a partial 
defense of “unrestricted” theological voluntarism.7 (I’ll use the shorter 
term “theological voluntarism” in what follows.)
4Cf. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 320.
5Cf. Quinn, “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics.”
6There’s an uninteresting sense in which lots of actions are in some respects good and in 
some respects bad. The claim, more carefully, is that God cannot make the very qualities that 
make some action, person, or state of affairs morally good, also make it morally bad.
7Some theological voluntarists (including, e.g., Quinn in later work (“An Argument for 
Divine Command Ethics,” “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics”), Alston (“Some 
Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists”), and Adams (“A Modified Divine Command 
Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,” “Divine 
Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation”)) avoid the contingency objection by 
restricting the explanatory scope of their views (for a nice, concise discussion of historical 
precedents, see Haldane, “Voluntarism and Realism in Medieval Ethics”). These authors 
suggest that moral wrongness or moral obligation arises from the divine will, whereas other 
moral properties and values have their source elsewhere (perhaps they are simply neces-
sary or arise from God’s nature rather than his will). “Restricted” theological voluntarists 
can deal handily with the contingency objection, since on their view God has good moral 
reasons to will that wrongness or obligation be as they are. I will not have the space to eval-
uate restricted theological voluntarism here. (Murphy, in God and Moral Law, and “Restricted 
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I will argue for two different logical constraints on morality—one con-
straining cruelty and one constraining morality itself. It’s important to 
be clear on the status of these claims. In one sense I  suppose these are 
“analytic”; I will appeal to our sense of the concepts cruelty and morality 
for their justification. And moreover I claim that these limit the logically 
possible moral states of affairs. But, as controversies amongst logicians 
demonstrate, to argue for something as a principle of logic is not to sug-
gest that it is undeniable or must be uncontroversial once properly under-
stood. If analyticity is taken to imply the impossibility of disagreement 
among competent language users (as, arguably, it should not be if there 
are to be any analytic truths8), I do not claim these as analytic truths. I sim-
ply do not defend theological voluntarists who reject them. My aim is to 
show that there’s a compelling way of being a theological voluntarist—i.e., 
being a theological voluntarist who also accepts formal, logical constraints 
on the ways morality might be—that allows one to satisfactorily answer 
the contingency objection. Part of the burden of the paper will be to show, 
especially in section 7, that these constraints are not only plausible but 
consistent with motivations for theological voluntarism.
I’ll proceed as follows. In section 2, I’ll formalize the simple reductio 
of theological voluntarism generated by the thought that, if theological 
voluntarism is true, then cruelty could be morally good. In section 3, I’ll 
critique and revise that reductio, inter alia introducing the broad strategy of 
considering logical limits on God’s moral will, which I expand on in sec-
tion 4. Sections 5 and 6 argue for an anti-opacity principle I call Suitability 
and show how it blocks the revised contingency reductio. In section 7, 
I close by considering the charge that the view I end up defending—the-
ological voluntarism + Suitability—is not real theological voluntarism.
2. The Contingency Objection: First Pass
Robert Adams nicely characterized the contingency objection, which he 
considered to be the “gravest objection” to divine command theory (a spe-
cies of theological voluntarism):
Suppose God should command me to make it my chief end in life to inflict  
suffering on other human beings, for no other reason than that He  
commanded it . . . Will it seriously be claimed that in that case it would be 
wrong for me not to practice cruelty for its own sake?9
Theological Voluntarism,” has criticized this strategy, claiming that restrictions both under-
cut positive motivations for theological voluntarism and generate new puzzles. See also 
Morriston, “What If God Commanded Something Terrible?” for discussion). My project 
is more radical; I want to defend unrestricted theological voluntarism: all moral facts—all 
moral reasons, obligations, and values—have their immediate source in God’s will. I here 
use “immediacy” following Murphy, “Restricted Theological Voluntarism,” 680.
8See Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, chapter 4.
9Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 320.
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Adams called a positive answer to this question “unacceptable,” and 
I agree.10 We should not accept that cruelty for its own sake could possibly 
be morally good. I want to begin by formalizing this common reasoning:
  1. If theological voluntarism is true, then God could have willed that agents 
engage in cruelty for its own sake.
  2. If theological voluntarism is true, then, if God could have willed that agents 
engage in cruelty for its own sake, cruelty for its own sake could have been 
morally good (or right).
  3. (By 1, 2) If theological voluntarism is true, then cruelty for its own sake could 
have been morally good (or right).
  4. Cruelty for its own sake could not have been morally good (or right). 
Conclusion: theological voluntarism is false.
The nonderived premises are just 1, 2, and 4. Premise 1 seems to follow 
from the very theological conception of God that helps motivate theolog-
ical voluntarism—a conception on which God is perfectly free, sovereign, 
and omnipotent. Premise 2 seems definitive of theological voluntarism. 
And premise 4 is a good candidate for being a bedrock moral intuition. 
This seems, at first, a damning reductio.
3. The Revised Contingency Objection
Yet theological voluntarists can (and should) deny premise 1. Adams him-
self is clear that this premise—“that it is logically possible for God to com-
mand cruelty for its own sake”—is an assumption, though he also claims 
it seems difficult for voluntarists in particular to deny it and that, e.g., 
William of Ockham would have accepted it.11 I  claim that even radical, 
Ockham-esque theological voluntarists should reject premise 1.
This is because “cruelty” is a moral concept, a thick term necessarily 
implying significant (pro tanto) moral badness.12 A cruel trick is one that, 
ceteris paribus, ought not to be played; cruel treatment of any person is, 
ceteris paribus, impermissible. But when we call an action cruel we actu-
ally do something a bit stronger; we say that the cruelty of the action is 
(part of) what makes it bad. A cruel trick’s cruelty is always a (significant!) 
moral reason not to play it, just as a kind gesture’s kindness always counts 
in favor of its moral goodness. I claim an action’s cruelty is, necessarily, a 
serious reason counting against the morality of its performance.
Now one might argue that there are some cruel actions that nonetheless 
ought to be done, such as torturing an innocent person in order to appease 
a demon threatening to destroy the whole world. The demon might even 
command specifically cruel treatment; nothing else would cause him to 
refrain from world destruction. In such recherché cases, it may be that 
one has an instrumental moral reason to be cruel (for a more realistic case, 
10Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 321.
11Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 320.
12For the introduction of “thick concepts,” see Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.
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one might have reason to tell a cruel joke to cheer up a severely depressed 
friend with a twisted sense of humor).
But, regardless of whether cruelty is ever actually justified, supposing 
that it is in such cases is compatible with my claim. For in these cases, the 
putative final moral reasons for performing the cruel actions are certainly 
not that these would be cruel.13 Rather, the final moral reason for appeas-
ing the demon is that this would benefit others or preserve life. It’s the 
beneficence of the action that counts in favor of it. Similarly, the moral rea-
son for telling the cruel joke is one’s friend’s need; it’s the loving, caring, 
kind, or helpful nature of the action, rather than its cruelty, that makes it 
even plausible as permissible.
The question that’s important for my argument is whether an action’s 
being cruel always, necessarily, counts against it morally, to some extent 
or in some way. I take it the fairly clear answer is yes.
But if this is right, then trying to suppose that an action were cruel but 
that it was nonetheless good and right to perform the action “for its own 
sake” (i.e., because it was cruel) involves a contradiction. It is good and 
right to perform actions for the reasons that make them right. Were God 
to will that humans engage in cruelty for its own sake, cruelty—necessar-
ily a moral bad-making feature of actions—would have to function as a 
moral good-making feature of actions. And even Ockham, that paradigm 
of radical theological voluntarism, held that God cannot will a contradic-
tion into existence.14
Theists already accept many similar logical limitations on God. Again, 
God cannot will that 3 be a color—or that a square be also a circle, or 
that there be a rock he cannot pick up. Descartes aside, these constraints 
on God’s will are typically taken to be no mark against his sovereignty 
or omnipotence. I’m suggesting that in much the same way, God is con-
strained by logic when it comes to morality. God cannot make it the case 
that an action’s being cruel adds to its moral value, any more than he 
could make it the case that a shape’s having three sides makes it a square.
If this is granted, the theological voluntarist’s argument against prem-
ise 1 is straightforward:
  5. If God willed that agents engage in cruelty for its own sake, then a potential 
action’s cruelty would be a moral reason to perform it. (theological voluntarism)
  6. It is impossible that a potential action’s cruelty be a moral reason to perform 
it. (logic of cruelty)
  Conclusion: It is impossible that God will agents to engage in cruelty for its 
own sake.
13See Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness.”
14See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” for discussion and argument 
against the most radical understandings of Ockham’s voluntarism. Indeed, Ockham appears 
to have made similar claims about adultery to those I have made about cruelty. Namely, that 
God could command the act but only under a different name or description, since “adultery” 
connotes wrongness. Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing the adultery case to my 
attention. See also Osborne, “Ockham as a Divine Command Theorist,” 9.
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By leaning on a relatively simple claim about the logic of the concept of 
cruelty, the theological voluntarist can dispel this first version of the con-
tingency objection.
Of course, the rejoinder is waiting in the wings. God needn’t will cru-
elty under that description. Perhaps he could will that agents engage in 
actions satisfying the various nonmoral descriptions that—for us, given 
what God has willed in our world—make them count as cruel.15,16 In a 
different world, he could have willed actions that are in fact cruel in our 
world. Sure, he could not have made the moral badness of an action be 
its moral goodness. But the theological voluntarist does seem bound to 
think he could possibly have imbued, e.g., actions that cause intense pain 
sensations in sentient beings without any other significant effects or com-
plicating factors, with positive moral significance.
We must be careful here. For while some concepts like cruelty are clearly 
moral and others like intense sensations are clearly nonmoral, there are lots 
of concepts and terms in between. Take suffering. There is a natural under-
standing of suffering such that it necessarily has moral significance. In the 
current context, we should not use suffering in that sense to describe the 
kind of actions God might have willed.17 By the theological voluntarist’s 
lights, God could not have willed actions that are necessarily morally bad 
into moral goodness. But he could have willed actions that satisfy various 
purely nonmoral descriptions into moral goodness.18 And that is a strange 
and troubling enough thought to generate a revised version of the contin-
gency objection to theological voluntarism:
  1* God could have willed that agents engage in what is, in our world, cruelty 
for its own sake.
  2* If theological voluntarism is true, then, if God could have willed that agents 
engage in what is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake, then what is in our 
world cruelty for its own sake could have been morally good (or right).
  3* (By 1, 2) If theological voluntarism is true, then what is, in our world, cruelty 
for its own sake could have been morally good (or right).
15Cf. MacIntyre, “Which God Ought We to Obey and Why?” 360; Murphy, God and Moral 
Law, 123.
16It’s famously difficult to formulate purely descriptive, nonmoral rules separating what 
we take to be cruel actions from what we take to be non-cruel actions. Although I myself 
am pessimistic about general nonmoral rules sufficient to identify cruel actions, I think this 
objection is dialectically unhelpful to me. God’s will for agents might look very particularist 
and piecemeal. But this would not separate the world in which God wills what is, in our 
world, cruelty, from our actual world, in which he anti-wills such behavior and instead wills 
what is in our world noble or loving (also a particularist, piecemeal affair).
17Thanks to Michael Rea for helpful discussion on this point.
18Cf. Foot, “Moral beliefs,” for classic discussion of the flexibility of “goodness.” Foot’s 
interlocutor thinks that “morally good” is an extremely flexible, purely evaluative concept 
that could in theory be predicated of all kinds of trivial actions—a position superficially sim-
ilar to mine. Foot argues convincingly that this cannot be so, absent what she calls a “special 
background.” I think the theological voluntarist should think of God’s counterfactual willing 
as precisely the kind of special background Foot allows for. Thanks to José Eduardo Porcher 
for pointing me to this reference.
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  4* What is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake could not have been morally 
good. (Moral Impossibility)
  Conclusion: theological voluntarism is false.
Moral Impossibility, or 4*, is less intuitive than 4 and, ultimately, I will 
argue the theological voluntarist should reject it. However, I do not pre-
tend that Moral Impossibility is implausible or should be given up 
readily. In order to reject Moral Impossibility convincingly, the theolog-
ical voluntarist should identify a true premise in the vicinity of Moral 
Impossibility that is consistent with theological voluntarism. I propose:
Human Moral Impossibility: What is, in our world, cruelty for its own 
sake could not have been morally good, for human moral agents.
That is, there are no humans or human counterparts, in any possible 
world, for whom the sorts of actions that in our world count as cruelty are 
morally good. I affirm Human Moral Impossibility. But notice that it is 
insufficient for the revised contingency argument to go through. Human 
Moral Impossibility is fully consistent with theological voluntarism and:
Alien Moral Possibility: What is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake 
could have been morally good, for some alien agents.
In the rest of the paper, I’ll argue that a logical constraint on morality I’ll 
call Suitability secures Human Moral Impossibility, in a way that is 
consistent with Alien Moral Possibility as well as theological volunta-
rism and its motivations.
4. Logical Limits on Morality
First, however, it will be helpful to stress again just what sort of principle 
Suitability is supposed to be. In the previous section, I argued that some 
of our moral concepts, like the concept of cruelty, have a logic. There are 
logical facts about how these concepts necessarily relate to some other 
concepts (e.g., good, bad, right-making, blameworthy, etc.). Here, I want to 
suggest that the concept of morality itself also has a logic. There are facts 
about what morality or moral facts—i.e., moral values, norms, and/or rea-
sons—must be like in any moral world.
Let’s start with an easy one:
No Cheese: Morality cannot consist in blocks of cheese.
No Cheese is, I hope, uncontroversial. Why is that? While there is signif-
icant controversy over what it takes for something to be a moral fact—
as opposed to a legal fact, or a biological fact, or an aesthetic fact—there 
are some loose boundaries of the concept that rule out cheesy possibilities 
definitively. Just as God cannot will 3 to be a color, he cannot will morality 
to be cheese. This is, of course, a very minimal constraint on God’s moral 
will, which (I hope) no one will dispute.
On the other end of the spectrum, though, it seems to me theological 
voluntarists should be leery of very substantive principles, if those are 
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supposed to constrain what any logically possible system of morality 
might involve. For example, someone might claim that morality neces-
sarily and as a matter of logic has to do with promoting flourishing over 
suffering, or that it has to do with respect for justice, etc. If that were right, 
then God would seem to be limited by such putative logical truth about 
morality as well. But, given the high view of God’s omnipotence and sov-
ereignty that often leads one to theological voluntarism in the first place, 
it seems safer to suppose that there are no such substantive constraints on 
the logic of morality, or at least none of which we can be confident. The 
unrestricted theological voluntarist, to enjoy the positive motivations for 
her view,19 should maintain God’s perfect freedom and control over all 
of morality. This is consistent with some logical constraints, such as No 
Cheese, but substantive constraints on the sorts of acts/agents/states of 
affairs that can be morally good are a different matter and would seem to 
compromise the position.
What about principles “in the middle,” so to speak? Are there purely 
formal, voluntaristically acceptable principles constraining the logic of 
morality (and hence constraining God’s moral will) that nonetheless have 
more bite, or tell us more about what any moral system must be like, than 
No Cheese?
We might start with:
Normativity: Moral facts can matter to what moral agents should do.
Any world with moral reasons, values, or norms is a world where it is pos-
sible that agents should do something because of those reasons, values, 
or norms. Even God could not make a genuinely moral world of which 
this was not true. Of course it’s possible to be skeptical about whether one 
really should do what one morally should do. But if one is skeptical about 
whether moral facts could matter at all to what one really should do, then 
it seems that one is skeptical of genuine morality (as distinct from socio-
logical facts about what people would say is/isn’t moral).
So it seems morality, whatever else it might be like, has the ability to 
matter to what moral agents should do. But talk of what agents “should” 
do is a bit ambiguous, and I believe we can say something a bit stronger 
than Normativity. For there is a strained sense of “should” that’s purely 
evaluative rather than action-guiding. I  might, e.g., say wistfully that 
I “should” have gone on vacation back in January 2020, before the covid-
19 pandemic hit the US (this would have been very good for me, let’s 
suppose), even though I  couldn’t possibly have known this at the time 
or acted rationally in taking my vacation so early. But it seems to me the 
more natural sense of “should” is action-guiding; it’s indexed to the sorts 
of considerations agents do or could appreciate and be motivated by. And, 
in the following section, I  intend to defend a very weak version of the 
requirement that any properly moral system must not only be normative 
19Cf. Murphy, “Restricted Theological Voluntarism.”
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in some, possibly purely evaluative sense; it must be, at least in principle, 
the sort of system that some moral agents can grasp and respond to:
Suitability: Moral facts are suited to the appreciation of the kinds of moral 
agents to whom they apply.
In section six I’ll explain why I think this relatively thin, formal constraint 
on God’s moral will is nonetheless strong enough to rule out the most 
troubling possibilities pressed by the contingency objection to theological 
voluntarism; it’s strong enough to secure Human Moral Impossibility. 
But first, why accept Suitability as a logical constraint on morality?
5.  suitAbiLity
My argument for Suitability will take the form of (1) considering argu-
ments for and against a much stronger position, existence internalism; (2) 
showing how Suitability captures some of the motivations for existence 
internalism without incurring its primary cost; and (3) responding to an 
objection from the variation of moral principles that human moral agents 
in different societies have seemed (un)able to appreciate.
5.1. Existence Internalism
Consider:
Moral Existence Internalism: Moral reasons must be capable of motivat-
ing the agents to whom they apply.
Moral Existence Internalism is distinct from moral judgment inter-
nalism, the latter being a thesis about what making a moral/normative 
judgment entails.20 Moral Existence Internalism is also distinct from 
a more general reasons internalism, a thesis about the possible motiva-
tional power of all normative practical reasons. And yet a good deal of 
the plausibility of moral existence internalism derives from that more 
general thesis.
In Williams’s classic paper arguing for general reasons internalism, 
he appeals to the possessibility and explanatory power of reasons. On 
the first: “If something can be a reason for acting, then it could be some-
one’s reason for acting on a particular occasion [. . .].”21 Reasons apply to 
agents. They are, necessarily, the sorts of things that may be possessed 
and used. The quote continues, emphasizing their explanatory power: 
“[. . .] and it would then figure in an explanation of that action.”22 Once 
we are considering a person’s reason for acting, we are considering the 
sort of thing that can explain or justify a performance, as having ration-
ally prompted it. Korsgaard summarizes general reasons internalism suc-
cinctly: “[I]t seems to be a requirement on practical reasons, that they be 
20Cf. Darwall, Impartial Reason.
21Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 106.
22Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 106.
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capable of motivating us.”23 If this general thesis is true, then—so long as 
moral reasons are a species of practical reasons—so is Moral Existence 
Internalism.
Now one might also try to motivate Moral Existence Internalism on 
specifically moral grounds, or at least on grounds less tied up with the phi-
losophy of reasons and rationality. Consider Kant’s “ought implies can.” 
It is at least arguable that a moral agent is excused from typical moral 
requirements, in some situation, if she is actually unable to comply with 
those. This too, in a different way, suggests that the sort of considerations 
that can motivate an agent matter to what is actually morally demanded 
from her; they seem to matter at least to the sorts of motivations she may 
be morally required to act from.
On the other hand, Moral Existence Internalism and its more gen-
eral cousin, reasons internalism, face significant challenges. Most nota-
bly, existence internalists seem unable to secure sufficient objectivity for 
moral/normative reasons. Consider Parfit’s Future Tuesday Indifference 
case.24 Parfit imagines a “certain hedonist” who “never cares about possi-
ble pains or pleasures on a future Tuesday. Thus he would choose a painful 
operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful opera-
tion on the following Wednesday.”25 Parfit’s claim is that “This man’s pat-
tern of concern is irrational. Why does he prefer agony on Tuesday to mild 
pain on any other day? Simply because the agony will be on a Tuesday. 
This is no reason.”26 To put the point only slightly more strongly, we might 
say this man has a reason not to choose the more painful operation next 
Tuesday, regardless of whether he himself can see it or be brought to care 
about it.
The moral version of this problem is perhaps even clearer. Shafer-
Landau gives a nice statement of it:
Consider a person so misanthropic, so heedless of others’ regard, so bent on 
cruelty, that nothing in his present set of motives would prevent him from 
committing the worst kind of horrors. He cannot, in the relevant sense, be 
moved to forbear from such behaviour. But why should this unfortunate fact 
force us to revise our standards for appropriate conduct? Nothing we say to 
him will convince him to modify his behaviour. But is this intransigence a 
basis for holding him to different standards, or isn’t it rather a justification 
for convicting him of a kind of blindness? It is natural to say that people 
have reason to refrain from behaviour that is fiendish, callous, brutal, arro-
gant, or craven. We don’t withdraw such evaluations just because their tar-
gets fail (or would, after deliberation, fail) to find them compelling.27
In this paper I want to remain neutral on Moral Existence Internalism 
and reasons internalism generally. Instead of adjudicating those disputes, 
23Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” 11.
24Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 123–124.
25Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 124.
26Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 124.
27Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 187.
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my aim is to point out one very weak thing that I  think internalists get 
right, which does not threaten the objectivity of reasons or morality.
5.2. suitAbiLity vs. morAL existence internALism
Namely, Suitability: moral facts have to be suited to the appreciation 
of the kinds of agents to whom they apply. Suitability simply rules out 
the possibility that morality is hopelessly opaque to moral agents, as a 
group.28 If Suitability is true, then it is impossible, e.g., that for humans 
in our world right now, there is a moral reason for humans to promote the 
instantiation of the color blue, or that it is strictly morally impermissible 
to type on a keyboard.
Two terms deserve attention in my definition, especially as these 
depart from the terminology of Moral Existence Internalism. First, 
Suitability refers to “appreciation” rather than motivation. This reflects 
an attempt at greater ecumenicism about how exactly moral considera-
tions should be able to move us or be grasped by us. In humans, appreci-
ating a moral fact typically involves a cognitive grasp of some reason for 
acting, an appropriate affective response, and concomitant motivational 
dispositions.29 Appreciating the moral wrong of racism typically involves, 
e.g., belief in the worth and dignity of all people, dispositions to anger 
and sadness upon encountering or considering racism, and motivation 
to behave in ways that are non- or anti- racist. But there is controversy 
over which of these elements is really central or necessary for a good 
grasp of a moral fact. We might think, especially after reading the previ-
ous subsection, that motivation is crucial. Yet motivation alone can be a 
blind, seemingly arational affair (thus, some might think, insufficient for 
“appreciation”), and, relatedly, motivation is often blocked by arational 
contingencies such as depression and exhaustion (thus, some might think, 
unnecessary for “appreciation”). Suitability requires that—whatever an 
appropriate grasp of morality looks like—at least some moral agents of a 
kind could be capable of that.
The second term needing attention is “kinds.” This marks the most 
interesting difference between Suitability and Moral Existence 
Internalism. Suitability does not say that moral facts must be suited 
to the appreciation of every individual moral agent; rather Suitability 
claims morality is necessarily connected to the appreciative capacities 
of at least some (typical or, alternatively, excellent) agents of a group or 
kind. Suitability leaves open the possibility of moral facts that would 
apply to those who really cannot appreciate what they ought to do but 
28Some theologians have held that (part of) morality is opaque outside of religion. I take 
it Aquinas thought this. This is not my own view, but it is compatible with Suitability. 
Perhaps humans have the capacity to appreciate morality but only because they have the 
capacity for religion. Thanks to Brian Leftow for bringing this to my attention.
29I have argued for a view of what a good grasp of moral facts involves, in a different 
dialectical context, in Callahan, “Moral Testimony.”
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who nonetheless belong to a kind of social, rational agents for whom such 
appreciation is possible. (A similar sort of principle may be plausible in 
the aesthetic domain: perhaps a genuinely beautiful piece of art needn’t 
be such that everyone can appreciate it as such, but it must be suited to the 
appreciation of at least some artistically-minded humans.)
Suitability is the claim that, whatever else morality may be, it has to 
be the kind of thing that moral agents—at least some of them, at least in 
some deep and partially idealized sense—could deeply make sense of and 
rationally respond to. Robust, universal opacity is not the kind of property 
a system of morality could have.
Suitability seems to me intrinsically plausible. It also pretty clearly 
enjoys a fortiori motivation from arguments favoring Moral Existence 
Internalism. It can capture a sense of Korsgaard’s claim, that practical 
(or, rather, moral) reasons have to be capable of motivating us. They must 
be capable of moving agents like us, agents of our kind, who share our 
broad appreciative capacities. Moreover, Suitability affirms that any 
moral “ought” implies some form of motivational/appreciative can: any-
thing I ought to do is such that I at least have the right kind of capacities to 
appreciate its goodness/rightness.
So Suitability captures some of the motivations supporting Moral 
Existence Internalism. Yet unlike classic versions of internalism, 
Suitability does not even seem to threaten objectivity. Parfit’s exhibitor 
of future Tuesday indifference and Shafer-Landau’s misanthrope both 
clearly belong to the same rational, social kind with people who do appre-
ciate reasons to avoid agony on future Tuesdays and to treat others well, 
so Suitability is compatible with thinking they too have such reasons.
My interest in Suitability, as I’ll argue in the next section, is that if 
Suitability is true, and true as a logical fact about morality, constraining 
logically morally possible states of affairs, this supports Human Moral 
Impossibility. For if Suitability is true, then even God couldn’t will some 
morality into existence that was wholly opaque to all the moral agents to 
whom it applied, and any moral system affirming the goodness/rightness 
of what we currently call cruelty would be opaque to humans or their 
counterparts.
But before completing my defense of that argument, I  want to con-
sider an important objection to Suitability. Namely, whole swaths of 
people have seemed to themselves to appreciate the moral rectitude of 
slaveholding, cannibalism, and torture of innocents. Concomitantly, they 
have failed collectively to appreciate moral reasons for respecting human 
dignity and freedom. If we understood “kinds” narrowly, as indexed to 
societies or cultures, then Suitability might seem to imply that they had 
no such moral reasons. Let me be clear: I disagree. All people have always 
had moral reasons not to support the institution of slavery. This is because 
groups or kinds of moral agents should be understood widely, defined by 
their broad capacities for moral appreciation (e.g., humans, not 18th century 
Southern gentry).
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Consider a society in which cannibalism—specifically the consump-
tion of those of an out-group as a show of strength, courage, and honor—
deeply makes sense to people as morally good. I  want to say it makes 
sense to think of even these people as having the same kind of appreciative 
capacities we do—“humans” is the right category here. For even people 
in this cannibalistic society could share some of our basic moral values 
and sensibilities. After all, honor—or integrity, or justice, or moral recti-
tude, or what have you—is a moral value. As is love for members of an 
in-group—one’s children, parents, or friends. Moreover, though this can-
nibalistic society is profoundly morally confused, there is a sense in which 
they could know better. They have the right kind of moral capacities, they 
have enough of a hold on the kind of things that matter morally—how-
ever tenuous that hold may seem—that moral improvement is not hope-
less for them, though it might indeed involve a great deal of time, effort, 
and re-enculturation in better moral society (indeed, I  suspect that not 
much better could be said of contemporary societies; we might substitute 
“factory farming” for cannibalism). Even humans in cannibalistic societies 
belong to a social, rational kind that can appreciate moral facts.30
6.  suitAbiLity and the Revised Contingency Objection
Let us return to the revised contingency objection to theological volunta-
rism. I want us to think carefully about the world envisioned by 3*—i.e., 
the merely possible world in which God wills what is in fact cruel (in our 
world) and where, according to the theological voluntarist, such behavior 
is morally good/right. The objector to theological voluntarism espouses 
Moral Impossibility and claims this world is impossible. But I want to 
suggest instead that this world is alien, in the sense that moral agents must 
be aliens rather than humans or human counterparts in such a world.
I suspect the usual way of trying to think about the world in which 
God’s commands are radically different is something like this: we try to 
imagine God’s will for humanity changing, at some unspecified point in 
the future. Or we try to imagine a hypothetical human history in which 
our familiar societies and psychological tendencies had developed under-
neath a strangely-willing God. In other words, we try to imagine rather 
nearby possible worlds in which God’s will might be different—and yet 
many other facts about moral agents’ histories, their natures, and, cru-
cially, their rational and moral capacities might remain the same.
It’s this procedure, I  suspect, that generates the strong intuition in 
favor of Moral Impossibility. There are no nearby possible worlds in 
which what is in our world cruel is instead morally good or right. Given 
Suitability, in order to consider a world in which some behavior is mor-
ally right or rational, one has to consider a world in which that behavior 
is suited to the appreciation of the agents to whom it applies. That is, one 
must imagine a world in which the best of agents could, while making 
30Thanks to Robert Adams for helpful discussion on the morality of other human societies.
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no moral mistakes, appreciate and be motivated by a reason to, e.g., cut 
off agents’ limbs at birth for the sake of their greater approximation of an 
oval shape.31
This is no small imaginative task. What would it be like to deeply and 
correctly appreciate the morality of such behavior? What would agents be 
like who were capable of such appreciation?
This part of my argument closely parallels an argument given in Street, 
where she defends attitude-dependent conceptions of normative rea-
sons. Street takes herself to be tackling “a modern, secular version of the 
Euthyphro debate.”32 Paraphrasing—does one have reasons to prefer the 
scratching of one’s finger to the destruction of the world because of some 
broader, deeper fact about our attitudes and desires? Or do we (typically) 
desire the former more than the latter because we have reason to do so? 
Street takes the first, attitude-dependent horn of the dilemma (the ana-
logue of theological voluntarism), and she agrees with critics of such posi-
tions that this commits her to seemingly outlandish possibilities. Ideally 
coherent but highly eccentric individuals—of which Parfit’s man with 
future Tuesday indifference is one example—might really have reason, 
e.g., to prefer the destruction of the world.
I am not espousing Street’s attitude dependence. What’s interesting for 
my purposes is the way Street attempts to make the outlandish plausible 
by, first, considering in detail what these ideally coherent eccentrics would 
have to be like. They are not, she argues, your kooky Uncle Fred or even 
the neo-Nazis next door. Those individuals are nowhere near ideal coher-
ence. Real-life kooky uncles and neo-Nazis are making ridiculous, tragic, 
and/or infuriating mistakes about what they really value and what this 
entails for how they should live. With some more careful sketches of ide-
ally coherent eccentrics in hand, Street proceeds to claim that initially out-
landish verdicts look at least more plausible than they might at first seem.
31It may be objected that these agents needn’t have the same, seemingly a-religious (or 
natural, or general-revelatory) access to moral facts that we seem to have. Perhaps these 
agents might appreciate the morality of cutting off limbs by (i) believing (correctly) that God 
wills them to do it, and (ii) desiring to be in harmony with God. Are agents who could “make 
sense of” cutting off limbs in that way necessarily alien? After all, this is how some (though 
not I) understand Abraham’s predicament: Abraham had, and knew he had, a moral reason 
to kill Isaac stemming from God’s command.
The world we are considering, however, is not one in which God overrides standing 
moral prohibitions on what is, in our world, cruelty. It is rather a world in which there are no 
prohibitions on such behavior. God hasn’t willed them. So—assuming Suitability extends 
to some negations of moral facts—we must imagine that the best of agents in this world are 
capable of seeing the matter such that they would not even be conflicted about whether to cut 
off limbs; they would not see it as a case of genuine competing considerations, or a case of 
revealed morality overriding “natural” morality. Those agents could not be humans.
See also note 28 above; in general, I  take no stand on the necessary epistemology of 
morality, whether this must be generally or specially revealed. Thanks to Mark Murphy for 
raising this issue.
32Street, “In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference,” 274.
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Similarly, an important aspect of my strategy is to suggest that it takes 
some care to think through what a world would be like if God had willed 
morality to be very different than in fact it is. Given Suitability, agents in 
that world would, as a kind, be capable of genuinely appreciating the moral 
goodness/rightness of what is, in our world, cruel.
These agents, I  claim, could not be humans (Human Moral 
Impossibility). They could not be our mothers or cousins or even our dis-
tant ancestors or descendants. For though our real cousins and ancestors 
may have highly, troublingly dubious moral views, these human individ-
uals are making mistakes. They merely seem to themselves to appreci-
ate, e.g., the goodness of cannibalism. But their confusion is, collectively, 
remediable. Human beings on the whole are capable of seeing the moral 
badness of cruelty. And any kind of moral agents whose typical or exem-
plary members were not capable of this but instead were capable of the 
total reverse would be an alien kind.
Of course, this involves some appeal to intuition. I will not here offer 
and defend any particular theory of human nature, psychology, or moral 
capacities that entails exclusion of the possibility that best (or typical) 
humans would be able to discern and respond to moral reasons to cut off 
the limbs of infants for the sake of ovalness. But my intuition in this case is 
a very strong one. And recall that the contingency objection to theological 
voluntarism rests on an intuition too: Moral Impossibility.
Formally, we can separate this reasoning into a few premises, gener-
ating an argument for Human Moral Impossibility that leaves Alien 
Moral Possibility intact:
  7. Morally good or right actions are suited to the appreciation of the kinds of 
moral agents to whom they apply (Suitability)
  8. Therefore, in the possible world envisioned by 3*, the moral goodness of 
what is, in our world, cruelty is suited to the appreciation of moral agents in 
that world.
  9. Any world in which what is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake is suited 
to the appreciation of moral agents, is an alien (non-human) world.
  10. (from 8, 9) The possible world envisioned by 3* is an alien (non-human) 
world.
  Conclusion: Human Moral Impossibility.
Any world in which God wills what is in our world cruelty, is an alien 
world, with alien moral agents. The theological voluntarist can espouse 
Human Moral Impossibility. But, so long as she thinks God really could 
have willed morality to be radically different, she must still espouse Alien 
Moral Possibility. What should we say about the possibility of such 
an alien morality? Is the theological voluntarist’s commitment to Alien 
Moral Possibility still strong enough to ground a contingency reductio 
of her view?
It seems not. Regardless of what we might find intuitive to say about 
the real moral obligations of alien agents (ought they really to cut off infant 
limbs? Would this be morally good in them in the same way that, e.g., 
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altruistic acts of generosity are good in humans?), I think the second-order 
question of how confident we should be in theorizing about morality for 
such agents is pretty clear (here again, I echo Street). We should be very 
humble about our abilities to theorize morality for alien beings. After all, 
all our fodder for moral theorizing comes from what Crisp calls “lived 
morality”—i.e., lived human morality.33 We should be much less confident 
about moral theorizing on behalf of alien creatures. If that’s right, then we 
should not confidently reject Alien Moral Possibility.
Recall that the dialectic is a defensive one. The revised contingency 
objection purports to demonstrate that theological voluntarism must be 
false. But the revised contingency objection relies on a premise—Moral 
Impossibility—which is too dubious to bear its argumentative burden.
It’s dubious, first, because once we separate Human Moral 
Impossibility from Moral Impossibility, it is not clear that we have strong 
intuitions supporting the latter, more general impossibility claim rather 
than the former, more specific one. And as I’ve been at pains to argue, 
the theological voluntarist can secure Human Moral Impossibility, by 
appeal to Suitability. Second, Alien Moral Possibility, considered in 
its own right, seems very difficult to rule out. The theological volunta-
rist with a high view of God’s sovereignty over morality should certainly 
accept Alien Moral Possibility. But all of us—even those without prior 
commitments or sympathies toward theological voluntarism—should 
admit that our abilities to reason about Alien Moral Possibility are lim-
ited by our terrestrial intuitions and imaginations.
In sum, theological voluntarism + Suitability can secure Human 
Moral Impossibility, and while some may still be uncomfortable with 
the view’s entailing Alien Moral Possibility, this is far from the sort 
of damning reductio of the view that the contingency objection is often 
claimed to be.
7. Real Theological Voluntarism?
I’ve presented myself as defending full-strength, unrestricted theological 
voluntarism. Yet I’ve done so by arguing for a significant constraint on 
God’s moral will. Actually, I’ve argued, God couldn’t have willed morality 
to be radically different—unless moral agents were also radically differ-
ent. One worry for my view is that it doesn’t really vindicate the high view 
of God’s sovereignty and omnipotence that (partly) motivates theologi-
cal voluntarism in the first place. I will consider two different versions of 
this worry.
First version: one might think real, full-blooded omnipotence entails 
a lot of “could haves.” God could have made pigs fly. Or made choco-
late taste like asparagus. Or made tomatoes talk. One who held this view 
would not be satisfied with proposals like, “Well, it’s true that God could 
have made pigs fly. But not our pigs—in order to make pigs fly many other 
33Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”
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important things in the universe would have to be differently arranged, 
we’d have to be talking about alien pigs, and that world would be very dis-
tant in modal space.” (Similar proposals would be unsatisfying for choc-
olate and tomatoes.) Why, then, should we be satisfied with the thought 
that God could have made morality different, but only if he created a very 
different sort of moral agents than us, in a distant possible world?34
Second version: this so-called theological voluntarism is actually more 
similar to natural law theory, Murphy’s “moral concurrentism,”35 or sim-
ply a theistic Aristotelian virtue ethics. For it seems that on my view, too, 
the kind of beings we are determines morality. God’s will in creating the 
natural order may have moral effects, but he lacks the power to immedi-
ately determine the moral order.
I have a three-part response that applies jointly to these versions of the 
worry. First, I have not said there is exactly one way morality could be 
for any humans or human counterparts. Indeed, it seems plausible to me 
that had God willed differently, e.g., justice and the alleviation of suffering 
might have had different relative weights in the moral system, for us. It is 
only when we imagine the scenario in which morality is radically differ-
ent—in which what is in our world morally bad (inequality) or morally 
irrelevant (the color blue, ovalness) is elevated to moral importance—that, 
so say I, we must be imagining a world of alien moral agents. This pre-
serves the idea that God has libertarian freedom in willing human morality 
even holding fixed the creation of humans with our basic moral capacities. 
Analogously—regardless of whether God could make (our) pigs fly, he 
could certainly have made them all reddish, or a little shorter, etc.
Second, even if we set this aside and assume that basic human capaci-
ties for moral appreciation admit of only one way human morality could 
be, there is still a question of priority. That is, does God will morality as 
he does because of the human moral capacities he has created? Or does he 
create human moral capacities to fit the morality he has willed? Or is the 
choice a single, unified one? As long as we do not assent to the first ques-
tion—as long as we do not see God’s moral will as constrained by a prior 
choice or commitment to human moral capacities—the freedom of God’s 
moral will seems intact. And nothing about my picture puts pressure on 
us to see God’s choice of capacities as coming “first” in this way.
Finally, there is a subtle but important difference between views on 
which a thing’s nature constrains morality and my view, on which agents’ 
capacities for moral appreciation constrain morality. On many other 
views, a thing’s nature slots into a necessary teleological framework of 
hypothetical moral imperatives. If a thing has this nature, its good and aim 
and, therefore, the moral norms/values/reasons that apply to it must be 
(roughly) like this.
34Thanks to Dean Zimmerman for suggesting this version of the objection.
35Murphy, God and Moral Law.
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I reject this strictly necessary moral framework and principle as too 
substantive a constraint on God’s moral will (although of course I can’t 
critique such views at any length here). The necessary conditionals my 
view entails are more formal, less substantive. They take the form: if moral 
agents have these moral capacities, then morality has to be (roughly) like 
this. I say that these are formal because, as I’ve argued, they fall out of the 
logic of morality, its being not-hopelessly-opaque as a matter of logical 
necessity. They are not, importantly, substantive moral claims about the 
good or aim of creatures with various natures, nor about the necessary 
moral relevance of creaturely aims.
8. Conclusion
My arguments, if successful, are a partial defense of theological volunta-
rism. Of course, there are other putatively devastating objections to the 
view besides the contingency objection. Most notably: how is the theolog-
ical voluntarist supposed to view God’s goodness? That is a question for 
another paper. The primary contention of the present paper is that even 
the theological voluntarist should accept some logical constraints on the 
ways God could have willed morality to be, and plausible candidates for 
those constraints seem sufficient to allay the contingency objection.36
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